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The "Necessary and Desirable
Counterpart": Implementing a Holmesian
Perspective of Labor Rights as Human
Rights
Tim Lourist
"In a case like the present, it seems to me that, whatever the
true result may be, it will be of advantage to sound thinking to
have the less popular view of the law stated. ... "I
Modern labor laws, developed during the bygone era of a
predominantly white, male, middle-class workforce, have stood
largely unchanged for more than half a century.2 Meanwhile,
globalization, increased capital mobility, technological innovation,
and the modern era of free trade policy have transformed a
country built on industry and manufacturing to one of contingent
workers, service employees, and professionals. 3 In addition, the
demographics of the U.S. workforce have undergone radical
transformations over the last few decades. 4 Today's labor pool is
much more diverse; and more women, immigrants, older workers,
and part-time workers in the workforce means that traditional
bastions of union organizing (i.e., white men) are the exception to
the rule in many industries.5
An important aspect of the changing composition of the labor
force and concurrent increase in corporate power is that laws
t. J.D. expected 2010. The author would like to thank Brendan D. Cummins
for his ideas and insights on the history and future prospects of the labor
movement. The author would also like to thank the editors and staff of Law &
Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their tireless efforts.
1. Vegelahn v. Gunter, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
2. In 1947, Congress amended the National Labor Relations (Wagner Act)
with the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) which, under the
guise of protecting an employer's freedom of speech, was designed to provide
management with more tools to oppose unionization. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (2006).
Together, these two Acts compose the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
3. See William John Bux & Miranda Tolar, Houston Janitors and the
Evolution of Union Organizing, 70 TEX. B. J. 426, 426 (2007).
4. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks . Privilege and
the United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1542, 1542-44 (1999).
5. Id.
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intended to level the playing field between employers and their
white, male employees-specifically the National Labor Relations
Act of 1937 (NLRA)-are reduced to toothless tools of
management. 6  Penalties for labor law violations are now
considered a cost of doing business, 7 and some argue that
"American labor law has failed to make good on its promise to
employees that they are free to embrace collective bargaining if
they choose."8
The labor/management playing field needs to be re-leveled. 9
However, as this Article argues, the current U.S. paradigm of
labor relations-where labor/management issues are viewed
through an economic lens that ultimately affords capitals'
interests a higher value than workers' rights-must first be
deconstructed. Towards that end, this Article adopts as a
foundational premise the labor/management dialectic posited by
then-Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes in his Vegelahn v. Gunter0 dissent. Justice Holmes
asserted that collective action necessarily provides workers in a
capitalist, free market society with the means to engage in the
"free struggle for life."' According to Justice Holmes, "if the battle
is to be carried on in a fair and equal way," public policy must
encourage collective worker action as the "necessary and desirable
counterpart" to the universally condoned and encouraged practice
of combining sources of capital.12  This Article argues for
meaningful labor law reform that seeks to achieve this Holmesian
labor/management relations structure based on the idea that labor
rights are fundamental human rights.
6. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Leveling the Playing Field for American Workers:
The Employee Free Choice Act, THE MAGAZINE OF THE LERA-ONLINE COMPANION,
Fall 2005, http://www.lera.uiuc.edulPubslPerspectives/onlinecompanion/fall05-
Kennedy%2oArticle.htm; see Sen. Arlen Specter & Eric S. Nguyen, Representation
Without Intimidation: Securing Workers' Right to Choose Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311, 321 (2008).
7. See Kennedy, supra note 6.
8. Specter & Nguyen, supra note 6, at 311 (citing Paul C. Weiler, Promises to
Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1769, 1770 (1983)).
9. Id. at 312 ("Union membership has dropped from approximately thirty-
three percent of workers in 1955 to only twelve percent in 2007[, and] many
scholars have argued that worker organization has been suppressed by employer
hostility and by shortcomings in the remedies provided . . . in the face of that
hostility.").
10. 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 1081 (Holmes. J., dissenting).
12. Id.
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It is well known that union membership has been in sharp
decline since the 1970s, and many scholars have discussed at
length the reasons for diminished union membership. 13 Whatever
the cause of this steady decline, one thing remains clear: U.S.
labor law "remains steadfast in the face of these changes, behaving
as if class consciousness and class solidarity were the only relevant
forms of collective worker protest."14 To be sure, modern workers
remain economically exploited based on class divisions. 15 Yet,
issues such as expanding economic inequality and increasing
diversity in the workforce have supplied employers with a greater
ability to divide and conquer the traditionally "united front" of
unionism.16
While Justice Holmes advocated free competition between
capital and labor, he was sure to point out that the "policy is not
limited to struggles between persons of the same class, competing
for the same end."17  As such, U.S. labor law policies should
"appl[y] to all conflicts of temporal interests."1 8  Fundamentally,
Justice Holmes' nineteenth century vision of labor relations-in
which the law must regard the rights of capital and labor
equally-remains relevant today. Additionally, his vision calls for
relaxed regulations on workers' rights to organize and strike,
enhanced remedial provisions for workers whose labor rights are
violated, and enhanced penalties for employers that violate
workers' basic human rights in the workplace.1 9
To meaningfully realize a Holmesian view of labor relations,
labor rights must receive the same level of protection and
enforcement as other universally recognized human rights in the
workplace, such as freedom from sex or race-based discrimination
13. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A
Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 362-77 (2002)
(positing such factors as globalization, changing workforce composition, rise in
contingent workers, employer opposition to unions, deficiencies in enforcement of
labor rights, and even "the rugged individualism of the American psyche" as
reasons for the decline in union membership). See generally Susan L. Dolin,
Lockouts in Evolutionary Perspective: The Changing Balance of Power in American
Industrial Relations, 12 VT. L. REV. 335 (1987) (discussing the evolution of labor
relations in the United States).
14. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 4, at 1542-44.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18. Id.
19. Justice Holmes' vision called for penalities beyond those contained in
legislation that is the subject of this Article. See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009,
H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).
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and harassment.20 A law can only be as strong as its enforcement
mechanisms; therefore, remedial provisions must sufficiently deter
employers from discriminating against employees who assert their
right to organize.21
Part I of this Article asserts that labor rights are human
rights and are recognized as such throughout the globe. The
United States, while acknowledging this concept through its
support of international treaties, has systematically failed to
promote workers' rights within its borders, with the ineffective
remedies and commercial agenda of the NLRA largely to blame.
In Part II, this Article outlines the basic history of U.S. labor
law in order to point out specific moments that have reduced the
statutory framework for protecting collective worker action-
previously considered a kind of illegal conspiracy-to a set of rules
that does little more than allow production to continue while
workers' issues are handled.
Next, Part III argues that U.S. labor law should reflect other
successful laws governing human rights in the workplace,
specifically Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),22 in
order to reestablish the labor/management equilibrium that early
proponents of labor laws imagined.
Part IV provides a brief analysis of the Employee Free Choice
Act (EFCA)23 and argues that, even though EFCA's provisions are
a step in the right direction, its enhanced protections for workers'
rights will not adequately protect workers who assert the right to
organize and collectively bargain with their employers.
I. Labor Rights Are Human Rights
A. International Recognition of Labor Rights as Human
Rights
As noted by Human Rights Watch, "[h]uman rights cannot
flourish where workers' rights are not enforced."24 Reflecting this
20. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17
(2006); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at
71-77, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
21. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1938)
(outlining policy interests in encouraging collective bargaining between
management and labor).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
23. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).
24. Lance Compa, Unfair Advantage: Workers' Freedom of Association Under
International Human Rights Standards, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Aug. 2000, at 10. This
study also emphasizes the point that, while workers in the United States generally
[Vol. 28:191
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fundamental correlation of worker and human rights, labor rights
are recognized in many international documents, such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which contains a
provision expressly upholding the right to form and join trade
unions in the workplace. 25 International labor standards can also
be found in International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions, 26
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 27 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 28
and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation. 29 Each
of these standards recognizes the concept that not only is freedom
of association in the workplace central to human standards of
dignity, but that workers' rights are an essential component of a
healthy democracy. 30
Indeed, "[flreedom of association is the bedrock workers' right
under international law on which all other labor rights rest."31
Governments around the globe are afforded the affirmative task of
keeping the power of labor and capital balanced in the private
sector: "States are ... obligated [under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by the United States] to
are not subjected to "gross human rights violations where death squads assassinate
trade union organizers or collective bargaining and strikes are outlawed," the U.S.
government, through a "sustained attack" on workers' rights, has failed to meet its
obligation to "deter such attacks and protect workers' rights." Id. at 12.
25. Article 23 states that "[e]veryone has the right to form and join trade
unions for the protection of his interests." Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 20, art. 23. The objective of this provision stands in notable contrast to
the stated goal of the NLRA, which protects employee organization not for the
protection of the worker's interest, but because it "safeguards commerce from
injury .. " See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
26. See, e.g., ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233 (1998) (acknowledging the importance of labor rights
in the field of human rights).
27. Article 22 states, "[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of association
with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of
his interests." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 22, adopted
Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
28. Article 8 ensures "[tihe right of everyone to form trade unions and join the
trade union of his choice . . .for the promotion and protection of his economic and
social interests." International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
art. 8, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2 (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
29. Enacted as a supplemental agreement to the North American Free Trade
Agreement, the Preamble to the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC) asserts that one of its main goals is to "protect, enhance and enforce basic
workers' rights." North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Sept. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993).
30. James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: The Perils and Promises of
Transnational Labor Solidarity, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 85, 86 (2004).
31. Compa, supra note 24, at 19.
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protect the formation or activities of association against
interference by private parties."32
International human rights laws also provide protections
against repression of workers' rights to organize, 33 and thus
government authorities may not "harass workers, arrest them,
imprison them, or physically abuse or kill them for such
activities." 34  Furthermore, international law mandates that
governments take sufficient steps to ensure that workers' rights to
organize are protected by providing adequate remedial provisions
for workers whose rights have been violated. 35
The United States has, at least outwardly, stood behind the
principles contained in these documents. 36  For example, the
United States has been a strong supporter 37 of the ILO's 1998
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
(Declaration),38 which states:
Whereas, in seeking to maintain the link between social
progress and economic growth, the guarantee of fundamental
principles and rights at work is of particular significance in
that it enables the persons concerned, to claim freely and on
the basis of equality of opportunity, their fair share of the
32. Id. at 20 (noting that the United States unsuccessfully proposed a provision
which would only protect the freedom of association from governmental
interference) (quoting Manfred Nowak, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 387 (1993)); see also International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 27, art. 2 (providing that each signatory State
"undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative
or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the
present Covenant"). Although it became a signatory in 1977, the United States did
not ratify the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights until 1992, and only after
President Bush proposed a number of reservations that undermined many of the
rights the Covenant sought to protect. John Quigley, The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287,
1288-90 (1993).
33. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
supra note 28 (requiring signatory States to take affirmative steps to ensure
protection of labor rights, including the right to strike).
34. Compa, supra note 24, at 23.
35. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
27, art. 2(3)(a) ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes .... [t]o
ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated
shall have an effective remedy .. " (emphasis added)).
36. See Compa, supra note 24, at 59.
37. See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR
INTEGRAL DEVELOPMENT, STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITIES OF THE MINISTRIES OF
LABOR TO RESPOND TO THE CHALLENGES OF PROMOTING DECENT WORK IN THE
CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION 6-7 (2007) (outlining the U.S. Department of Labor's
efforts to promote the rights contained in the Declaration).
38. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, supra note
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wealth which they have helped to generate, and to achieve
fully their human potential.39
In addition, the ILO Declaration reinforces the affirmative duty of
governments to enforce labor rights as human rights:
[A]Ill Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions
in question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of
membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to
realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution,
the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are
the subject of those Conventions, namely: (a) freedom of
association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining .... 40
Subsequent to the U.S. ratification of the ILO Declaration,
U.S. Department of Labor Secretary Alexis M. Herman
commented, "[w]e know that the fundamental rights of workers...
ought be [sic] implemented by all nations, and certainly by all who
would claim to be members in good standing of this
organization.41 Secretary Herman justified this call to action
based on ideas of global economic growth, political interests in
providing workers a chance to participate in economic
globalization, and core values of basic dignity and respect of these
rights. 42
The reality for many U.S. workers however, is that dignity
and respect in the workplace are the exception to the rule,43 as the
United States has hesitated to adopt domestically the labor
standards that it seeks to impose on other nations.44 Even while
accepting ILO jurisdiction over complaints of workers' rights
violations, the United States has largely ignored recommendations
to ratchet up enforcement of labor rights within its borders. 45 In
1999, after holding to the proposition that domestic labor practices
are "in general conformance" to international standards in prior
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Alexis M. Herman, U.S. Sec'y of Labor, Statement at the International
Labor Conference (June 9, 1998) (transcript available at
http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programslhistorylherman/speeches/980609ah.htm).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Compa, supra note 24, at 9 (quoting Ernest Duval, a worker who
was discriminatorily fired in 1994 for union activities: "I know the law gives us
rights on paper, but where's the reality?").
44. Id. at 60.
45. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN
PRACTICE: LESSONs LEARNED 87 (2008) (highlighting the United States' failure to
ratify two universally accepted ILO Conventions which protect the right to
organize: No. 87-Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise




years, the United States "acknowledged for the first time that
'there are aspects of [the U.S. labor law] system that fail to fully
protect the rights to organize and bargain collectively of all
employees in all circumstances."'46
Despite the United States' fine rhetoric about the virtues of
labor rights enforcement, economic forces-such as modern free
trade policies-have effectively shifted the balance of power from
workers to capital interests. Of course, in an era defined by
globalization and capital mobility, workers are exceedingly
affected by international trade policies.47  Free trade policies
"greatly restrict[ a nation's ability to implement or enforce
provisions for worker protection"48 because setting the bar too high
hampers trade and impedes the power of commerce. Thus, in an
effort to remain economically viable in an increasingly global
market, the United States has declined opportunities to become a
signatory to several international labor agreements. 49
As one commentator noted, "laws that fail to provide
minimum labor standards, a decent or even subsistence level
minimum wage, or which provide obstacles to union organization
create a domestic trade advantage, discriminating against those
nations that do set minimum wages or accord association rights
consistent with [ILO] standards."50  Effectively enforcing labor
standards may impede a nation's ability to maintain a competitive
trade advantage, and therefore, some countries may not
adequately enforce international labor standards "due to the
pressures of international trade competition."5' 1
46. Compa, supra note 24, at 60-61, (citing UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO
THE ILO (1999)); see also Justin D. Cummins, Invigorating Labor: A Human Rights
Approach in the United States, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 7-31 (2005) (arguing that
domestic labor law can overcome its impotency through enforcement of
international labor standards such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
47. See Atleson, supra note 30, at 91.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 92 ("[The United States has been reticent to sign on to the vast
majority of [ILO] documents. The United States has approved only seven ILO
documents, placing near the bottom of nations affirming international labor rights
documents."); INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, RATIFICATIONS OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS BY COUNTRY 1 (2009), available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/docs/vdeclworld.htm.
50. Atleson, supra note 30, at 91.
51. Id. at 93. To avoid the feared "race to the bottom" that necessarily occurs in
the absence of comprehensive enforcement of international labor standards, some
progressive legislators in 1999 drafted a congressional resolution that outlined
principles for a sustainable global economy founded on labor rights and
environmental protections; however, the Resolution was not enacted. Global
Sustainable Development Resolution, H.R. Res. 479, 106th Cong. (2000).
[Vol. 28:191
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B. Modern Free Trade and Economic Policies Fail to
Recognize that Labor Rights Are Integral to Human
Dignity
As one scholar noted, "[tihe current hegemony and
acceptance of [prioritizing capital interests] makes it difficult to
raise claims based upon what may be seen as 'weak' arguments
based on human dignity, democratic values, justice, and worker
rights."52  Some maintain that the free market, left to its own
devices, will "necessarily order and allocate rights efficiently,"53
and inequalities between the haves and the have-nots that stem
from competitive free trade are a natural and acceptable result of
individual autonomy in the workplace. 54 Individual freedom of
contract, therefore, is the preferred model for an efficient and
productive labor market.5 5 Under this model, unions function as
labor cartels, 56  unfairly suppressing market forces to the
52. Atleson, supra note 30, at 93.
53. See Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers' Rights:
The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 MO. L. REV. 1, 50 (2007); see also Atleson,
supra note 30, at 20-26 (discussing and critiquing free market economic theories as
applied to the labor market).
54. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 162-63 (1962)
(characterizing income inequality as the "equalizing differencen" that corresponds
to market participants' "net advantages" and is the desirable result of properly
functioning markets); Ronald H. Coase, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, Prize Lecture: The Institutional Structure of
Production (Dec. 9, 1991), (transcript available at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/1991/coase-lecture.html)
(upholding the central tenet of economist Adam Smith's "invisible hand" theory of
market efficiency). "The economy could be co-ordinated by a system of prices (the
'invisible hand) and, furthermore, with beneficial results." Id. However, "to be
completely effective, the invisible hand requires perfectly competitive markets,"
which do not exist in reality. STEPHEN BEFORT & JOHN BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS,
INVISIBLE OBJECTIVES 132 (2009). Furthermore, even Adam Smith understood
that the human aspect of the labor market necessitated some level of government
regulation in the form of a minimum wage. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 71-72 (C.J. Bullock ed., P.F.
Collier & Son 1909) (1836) ("But though in disputes with their workmen, masters
must generally have the advantage, there is however a certain rate below which it
seems impossible to reduce, for any considerable time, the ordinary wages even of
the lowest species of labor.").
55. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 54, at 123-25 (arguing that union power to raise
wages for one sector of the workforce unfairly disadvantages other sectors); George
C. Leef, Workers and Unions-How About Freedom of Contract?, FREEMAN, Dec.
1992, at 1, available at http://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/
workers-and-unions-how-about-freedom-of-contract.
56. E.g., James Sherk, What Unions Do: How Labor Unions Affect Jobs and the
Economy, BACKGROUNDER, May 21, 2009, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Labor/ bg2775.cfm (arguing that unions operate
as labor cartels, artificially inflating the price of labor in a given market, while
simultaneously reducing investments, jobs, and profits to the detriment of society
as a whole); United Rentals Highway Techs., Inc. v. Ind. Constructors, Inc., 518
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detriment of businesses, and thus communities.57 In opposition to
this viewpoint, proponents of labor rights point out what some see
as a "race to the bottom" that results in an unregulated market,
which necessarily subjugates workers' autonomy and dignity to
the interplay of markets in order to maximize profits. 58 The free
trade model views business efficiency and wealth as the only
legitimate ends and disregards worker dignity and autonomy as
equally valid goals of public policy.59
Under freedom of contract and free trade systems, however,
"the market fails to (1) treat 'individuals as persons of independent
moral worth,' or (2) provide each person with opportunities 'to
bring meaning to his or her life through work."' 60  These
conclusions stem from the principle that any adverse employment
action taken against a worker will have a direct and substantial
effect on the worker's sense of self-worth, even if the adverse
action was economically motivated and not based on the worker's
personal shortcomings. 61  From this perspective, in an at-will
employment setting, the worker's sense of dignity is at the mercy
F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[C]ollective bargaining agreements ... are held not
to violate the Sherman Act, to avert too sharp a clash between antitrust and labor
policies, even though such agreements affect the prices and output of goods and
services, just as sellers' cartels do, by driving wages above competitive levels."
(citations omitted)); FRIEDMAN, supra note 54, at 124-25 ("[Some unions] are better
interpreted as enterprises selling the services of cartellizing an industry than as
labor organizations.").
57. E.g., Posting of Richard Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog, Can the United
Auto Workers Survive?, http://www.becker-posner-blog.comlarchives/2008/
12/cantheunited.html (Dec. 28, 2008, 16:26 EST) ("I don't think there's much to
be said on behalf of unions, at least under current economic conditions."). But see
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 676, 723 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) ("The very purpose and effect of a labor union is to limit the power of an
employer to use competition among workingmen to drive down wage rates and
enforce substandard conditions of employment."); RICHARD POSNER & FRANK
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 31 (2d ed. 1981) ('The main purpose of labor unions is to
raise wages by suppressing competition among workers .... ").
58. Lofaso, supra note 53, at 21-22. As employers lower wages in order to
compete in the global market, other countries are more likely to lower labor
standards to remain viable economic competitors abroad. See Befort, supra note
13, at 352.
59. See K. WILLIAM KAPP, THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 49 (1950)
("[T]he entrepreneur, in his desire to reduce the costs of production as far as
possible, will generally be reluctant to consider the impairment of the physical and
mental capacities of his laborers as part of the costs of his enterprise."); Lofaso,
supra note 53, at 22.
60. Lofaso, supra note 53, at 30 (citing HUGH COLLINS, JUSTICE IN DISMISSAL
153 (Paul Davies et al. eds., 1992)).
61. Id. at 29.
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of the employer, and workers as a group are denied meaningful
opportunities to participate in their own livelihoods. 62
Interestingly, Justice Holmes' vision of workers' right to
organize and collectively bargain is not totally incompatible with
some aspects of freedom of contract and free trade principles. 63 In
fact, injecting a Holmesian model of collective labor rights into
trade policies would uphold a more genuine freedom of contract for
workers who would gain collective power to avoid employment-
based adhesion contracts.64 Justice Holmes' model places labor's
interests on the same plane as capitalism's profits: "The right to
trade freely is appropriately conditioned on respecting the rights of
association,"65 that is, "if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and
equal way.' 66  Justice Holmes argued that workers should
collectively uphold standard levels of decency and dignity in the
workplace, even at the expense of capital's ability to remain
competitive:
The policy of allowing free competition justifies the intentional
inflicting of temporal damage, including the damage of
interference with a man's business by some means, when the
damage is done, not for its own sake, but as an
instrumentality in reaching the end of victory in the battle of
trade. 67
Thus, in the same manner that capital combines as a means of
gaining economic power in the global free trade market-to the
detriment of competitor businesses and even nations-labor
should combine in order to give workers an opportunity to enter
62. Id. Lofaso points out that some employers, recognizing the fact that
workers are not likely to abide by management's total control over employment
decisions, have implemented programs to allow increased employee participation;
however, such schemes are usually "designed to persuade workers to accept
decisions already made by management." Id. See also KAPP, supra note 59, at 49-
66 (illustrating how the weaker bargaining position of workers in an at-will system
requires workers to bear physical and mental depreciation costs, including
occupational diseases and injuries).
63. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, Linking Trade and Labor Standards: Prioritizing
the Right of Association, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 641, 644-50 (2006). But see Adkins
v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 567-68 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
against the Court's invocation of rigid "liberty of contract" principles in striking
down minimum wage laws).
64. Lieberwitz, supra note 63, at 650 ("rU]nder no legitimate conception of
freedom of contract is it required that employers have an advantageous bargaining
position over individual employees.").
65. Id.
66. Vegelahn v. Gunter, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
67. Id.
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into fair and free employment-based contracts with powerful
corporations. 68
For that level of equilibrium to occur, however, the law must
provide enforcement mechanisms that will effectively deter labor
law violations. In essence, the law must recognize, value, and
protect the human element of labor.69  Without adequate
protection, labor provided by the working population, especially
the low-wage and immigrant sectors, is indeed regarded as a
"commodity" to be bought at the lowest possible rate.
68. Id; see also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 253 (1996) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("The basic premise underlying our national labor policy is that
unregulated competition among employees and applicants for employment
produces wage levels that are lower than they should be."); BARBARA H. FRIED, THE
PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE 66-68 (1998) (outlining economist Robert
Lee Hale's belief that, because of the prevalence of laws intended to boost corporate
power, "it was simply untrue that the so-called unregulated state was formally
evenhanded in its treatment of citizens.").
69. Both Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized the human value
and unique characteristics that render traditional market regulations inapplicable
to labor. For example, based on the idea that "[t]he labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce," Congress exempted labor organizations from
the Sherman Act's provisions intended to prohibit monopolies in interstate
commerce. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914). Labor's exemption from antitrust
liability has since been broadly interpreted based, at least partly, on the principle
that workers must be allowed to organize against capital's economic interests to
further the NLRA's stated policies of promoting workers' rights. See id.; see also
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104-05 (1932) (limiting courts' power to issue
injunctions against collective worker action); Pro Football, 518 U.S. at 253
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[U]nregulated competition among employees and
applicants for employment produces wage levels that are lower than they should be
.... [The Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts] were enacted to enable collective
action by union members to achieve wage levels that are higher than would be
available in a free market."); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumber & Steamfitters Local
100, 421 U.S. 616, 622-23 (1975) (outlining the judicially created "non-statutory"
labor exemption from federal antitrust law intended to broaden the scope of the
explicit statutory exemption in order to facilitate national labor relations policies).
Interestingly, in a dissent, Justice Brandeis echoed Holmes' Vegelahn dissent that
common law actions for damage to business and antitrust claims are inherently
inapplicable to collective, non-violent worker action:
May not all with a common interest join in refusing to expend their labor
upon articles whose very production constitutes an attack upon their
standard of living and the institution which they are convinced supports
it? Applying common law principles the answer should, in my opinion, be:
Yes, if as a matter of fact those who co-operate have a common
interest .... It is conceded that, although the strike of the workmen in
plaintiffs factory injured its business, the strike was not an actionable
wrong; because the obvious self-interest of the strikers constituted a
justification.
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 481 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Further, Brandeis' dissent in Duplex Printing is credited as the
foundation for Congress' enactment of early twentieth century labor laws. See Pro
Football, 518 U.S. at 236 ("As a matter of history, Congress intended the labor
statutes. . . in part to adopt the views of dissenting Justices in Duplex
Printing .. ").
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This situation is where labor law finds itself today.
Violations of labor standards run rampant as workers are
devalued, and discriminatory threats, intimidation, and firings70
are the modus operandi of companies that profit from inadequate
enforcement of labor laws. The next Part of this Article analyzes
the current inadequacies in the NLRA and demonstrates that
worker's rights in the United States do not currently meet
minimum labor standards.
II. United States Labor Law Cannot Protect Twenty-First
Century Workers' Rights
The first step toward meaningfully enforcing workers' rights
is recognizing that the law must value collective worker action as
a means of promoting a higher standard of living for the working
class. The stated policy behind the enactment of the NLRA was
not to protect workers' rights in the interest of the workers
themselves, but instead to "eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce. '71 The
NLRA seeks to "protect[] the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives"
in order to "safeguard commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption .... " 72  Yet it remains silent regarding workers'
interests.73  "With the advent of mass production and the
corresponding depersonalization of work, human labor became
simply another commodity to be manipulated by the economic
dictates and interplays of the marketplace." 74
Importantly, Justice Holmes equated the term "free
competition" with the "free struggle for life." 75 That struggle, in an
70. For fiscal year 2008, of the 16,179 unfair labor practice charges filed with
the National Labor Relations Board (Board) against employers, there were 8121
charges for refusing to bargain with a legally certified union, and 6523 charges filed
for illegal discharge or other discrimination based on union membership. ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 5 (2008). While there were
6523 total charges filed against unions in the same year, of the Board's cases of
merit producing formal complaints, eighty-six percent were against employers and
only fourteen percent were against unions. Id. at 8.
71. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
72. Id.
73. Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 224 (2005) ('Those familiar with the NLRA know that it has
no section labeled 'values."').
74. Dolin, supra note 13, at 338-39 (noting that initial "[cloncern with workers
needs and wants gave way to a concept of worker fungibility" as unskilled factory
jobs outpaced "the art of the industrial craft").
75. Vegelahn v. Gunter, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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era of increasing economic disparity between business owners and
the workers they depend on 76-where there exists an "ever-
increasing might and scope of combination"77 in capital-goes
beyond mere economic concerns. The struggle affects "the
fundamental axioms of society, and even the fundamental
conditions of life."78
From the turn of the twentieth century, the United States
has seen the legal balance of rights between capital and labor
pendulate in a constant search for an equitable middle ground
that adequately protects both sides.79 Before Congress passed the
Wagner Act in 1937,80 U.S. employers were able to squelch worker
organization through "unbridled use of economic weapons against
them,"81  and capital's oligopolistic market power vastly
outweighed labor's ability to assert itself even when workers were
able to organize.8 2  Recognizing the social and economic
ramifications of a laissez-faire approach to labor relations-
especially during the Depression, when social unrest was on the
rise-Congress passed the Wagner Act, a broad regulatory scheme
designed to protect workers' rights and promote organization and
collective bargaining.8 3 Merely a decade later, however, Congress
curtailed the newfound union power-under the guise of employer
free speech and increased workplace democracy 4-through the
76. Globalization and free trade policies have allowed worker productivity to
grow dramatically since the 1980s, while wages have remained relatively flat in
comparison. See Damon Silvers, How We Got Into This Mess, AMERICAN PROSPECT,
May 2008, at 24.
77. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. See Specter & Nguyen, supra note 6, at 313-16; Befort, supra note 13, at
352-60. After the Wagner Act passed in 1937, union membership grew steadily,
reaching its peak of thirty-five percent of the workforce in 1954. Id. at 357. This
rapid rise in unionism was so strong that Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947 "in order to curb what was perceived to be excessive union power." Id.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
81. Dolin, supra note 13, at 343 ("Tactics included mass discrimination against
union activists, resulting in the blacklisting of many workers, as well as blatant
refusal to recognize even those unions which enjoyed majority support.").
82. Id. at 418-19. Dolin noted:
Before Congress intervened, government acted through its judicial system
to swing the balance of power so much in favor of management that, if a
union drive actually survived the organizational stage, any effort to utilize
self-help to obtain a collective bargaining agreement was met with the full
force of both the employer and court-ordered injunction.
Id.
83. Id. at 343.
84. Gerard D. Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 285, 285-89 (1960) (describing fears over the rapid rise in post-war
union membership and the resulting congressional objective of "restor[ing]
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passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.85 A few years later, union
membership peaked at about thirty-five percent of the total
workforce, but has been in consistent decline since the 1950s.86 In
2007, union membership in the private sector was 7.5% of the
workforce s 7 Tellingly, union membership today has dropped to
almost pre-Wagner Act levels, lending stark credence to the
assertion that the NLRA has failed in its effort to promote
unionization and equal bargaining power between employers and
employees.88
That failure can perhaps be traced at least in part to
Supreme Court interpretations of the NLRA, which have provided
greater latitude to employers seeking to discourage unionization
while placing disincentives on workers' willingness to assert their
rights in the workplace. Undermining the power of the general
strike8 9 and lessening restrictions on employer conduct during
elections 90 stand as two of the more fundamental derogations of
NLRA policy.
In fact, the Supreme Court began chipping away at NLRA-
granted worker rights almost immediately. A year after Congress
sufficient equilibrium to the field of industrial relations to enable our traditional
system of private enterprise to continue"). Interestingly, this same "workplace
democracy" argument has been widely propagated in opposition to EFCA, which
some claim will undermine democracy in the workplace by stripping workers of the
right to secret ballot. James Sherk & Paul Kersey, How the Employee Free Choice
Act Takes Away Workers' Rights, BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 4, 2009, at 1. The
assertion is untrue; as initially written, the bill simply provided workers with the
option to forego the secret-ballot election process. See Posting by Michael Whitney
to SEIU Blog, http://www.seiu.org/2009/03/wall-street-journal-employee-free-
choice-act-does-not-remove-the-secret-ballot.php (Mar. 20, 2009, 11:41 EST).
EFCA's opponents' campaign proved effective in July 2009 when Senate Democrats
stripped the "card check" provision from the bill. Steven Greenhouse, Democrats
Drop Key Part of Bill to Assist Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2009, at Al.
85. Between 1937 and 1947, union membership grew apace, giving rise to the
belief that the Wagner Act afforded unions too many rights while unfairly
restricting the role of the employer in the organizing process. See Alan Story,
Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 358 (1995). Notable changes brought under the
Taft-Hartley Act were the outright ban on the use of the secondary strike and
lessened restrictions on employer speech during an organizing campaign. Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-67, 171-87, 557 (2006)).
86. Befort, supra note 13, at 361-62.
87. This figure actually represents a slight increase in union membership from
2006 to 2007. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNION
MEMBERS SUMMARY (2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archivesl
union2_01252008.pdf.
88. Hoover Institution, Facts on Policy: Union Membership Rates (Jan. 16,
2007), http://www.hoover.org/research/factsonpolicy/facts/5166532.html.
89. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
90. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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passed the Wagner Act, the Supreme Court held in NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.91 that workers could be
permanently replaced during economic strikes.92 In effect, Mackay
Radio stripped unions of a primary economic weapon normally
utilized during labor disputes that arise out of contract
negotiations.93 The Court based its reasoning on the idea that
business interests outweighed the strikers' interests in gaining
bargaining power through the threat of strike.94 Interestingly, the
Court emphasized balancing employers' economic interests against
the workers' rights to strike without either party having raised the
issue. 95 In fact, since the enactment of the NLRA, the National
Labor Relations Board (Board)96  and courts have been
"determining the balance of bargaining power, and without any
explicit direction from Congress, indeed, contrary to the bare
words of the statute guaranteeing employees the right to engage in
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection."97
Another noteworthy example of judicial derogation of
employee freedom of association can be found in NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co.98 In Gissel, the Court held that the First Amendment
allowed employers to openly express their disdain for unionism in
the presence of workers, provided that it did not amount to
coercion or threats against unionization. 99 As one scholar noted,
"[e]mployer speech has become the primary instrument used by
employers to discourage unionization and collective bargaining,"
and placing limits on an employer's ability to indirectly coerce and
intimidate employees would better effectuate the policies of the
91. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
92. Id. at 345 (holding that it is not an unfair labor practice to replace striking
employees in order to allow normal business operations to continue).
93. Id.
94. Id.; see Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be
Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARiZ. L. REV. 397, 407 (1992).
95. Craver, supra note 94, at 407 (citing NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304
U.S. 333, 345 (1938)) (noting that notwithstanding the Act's prohibition against
interfering with the right to strike, "it does not follow that an employer, guilty of no
act denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his business
by supplying places left vacant by strikers.").
96. The Board was established by Congress in 1935 to administer the provisions
of the NLRA. National Labor Relations Board Homepage,
http://www.nlrb.gov/aboutus/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2009). The Board is
a quasi-judicial body comprised of a five-member governing board that adjudicates
labor disputes falling within the ambit of the NLRA, such as unfair labor practice
hearings and workplace representation elections. Id.
97. Clyde W. Summers, Questioning the Unquestioned in Collective Labor Law,
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 791, 815 (1998).
98. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
99. Id. at 616-20.
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Wagner Act.100 After all, it is important to recognize that anti-
union speech directed by an employer toward its employees will
always conjure up images of "an iron fist inside a velvet glove. ' 1° 1
While Justice Holmes recognized the economic interests at
work in the dynamic between labor and capital,10 2 he hinted at a
more fundamental goal by characterizing the struggle between
labor and capital as a "free struggle for life. '10 3 Justice Holmes
noted that labor "when combined... [has] the same liberty that
combined capital has, to support their interests by argument,
persuasion, and the bestowal or refusal of those advantages which
they otherwise lawfully control."10 4 From this perspective, labor
and capital can be viewed as alternate means to the same end, and
arbitrary legal distinctions between types of pooled resources
begin to fall apart.
Scholars generally agree, however, that labor laws have
operated in favor of business since the Taft-Hartley Act amended
the NLRA; the effects are manifest at least in part by the fact that
union membership has been in steady decline since about the time
that Taft-Hartley amended the Wagner Act, while charges of
unfair labor practices against employers have increased
dramatically.10 5 According to a 2005 study by the Economic Policy
Institute, fifty-three percent of the nonunion workforce desired
union representation yet were unable to attain union
recognition.' 06 The existing problem is that workers, despite their
desires to organize, remain cognizant of the fact that
management's reaction to unionization would most likely be
100. Summers, supra note 97, at 806.
101. Id. at 805. The phrase "an iron fist inside a velvet glove" originated from
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 460 (1964).
102. Vegelahn v. Gunter, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that
between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of
society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for the least
possible return.").
103. Id.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS'N., AAA POLICY BRIEF #1 (2007), available at
http://www.aaanet.org/pdf/AAAPolicyBrief092707.pdf.
106. RICHARD B. FREEMAN, Do WORKERS STILL WANT UNIONS? MORE THAN
EVER, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE BRIEFING PAPER #182 2 (2007), available at
http://www.sharedprosperity.orgbp182bp182.pdf. Additionally, the main finding
of this study showed that around eighty-five to ninety percent of workers wanted
greater collective workplace input in some form, whether or not they supported
union representation. Id. at 1.
2010]
Law and Inequality
hostile to their interests.10 7 Clearly, labor law cannot function
properly under this structure.
Indeed, "the NLRA was drafted to be far more than a
technocratic exercise."10 8 Drafted during the Depression, Congress
intended the law to "restructur[e] and transform this society" by
promoting "social democracy, solidarity, social and economic
justice, fair wages and working conditions, equality, and industrial
and social peace."10 9
Yet, "NLRA values have too often been ignored." 110  The
reality is that the United States currently fails to adequately
promote labor rights. Millions of workers are excluded from NLRA
protection,11 and many covered employees find that the current
labor law regime provides inadequate disincentives for
corporations and business owners to abide by the law, thereby
allowing unfair restraint on organizing.11 2 The Board requires
elaborate election procedures before a union can be certified as a
bargaining representative of employees. At the same time,
employees in support of unionization are particularly susceptible
to unlawful discrimination, intimidation, and retaliation-
especially low-wage workers who are economically dependent on
their employers (or, in the case of undocumented immigrant
workers, dependent on their work for their literal place in the
community).113
In fact, today's worker has an almost one in five chance of
being illegally discriminated against for union activity-in 2005,
31,000 employees were awarded back pay because of
discrimination for activity protected by the NLRA, a 500%
increase since the late 1960s.11 4 Furthermore, because back pay
and reinstatement are the only penalties that an employer faces
for unlawful discrimination-while the employee has a duty to
mitigate damages by seeking work elsewhere-it is not surprising
that cases of discrimination are on the rise while union
membership continues to fall. 11 5
107. Id. at 2.
108. Dannin, supra note 73, at 225.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 223.
111. See Compa, supra note 24, at 23; Befort, supra note 13, at 370.
112. See Specter & Nguyen, supra note 6, at 318-26.
113. See Leticia M. Saucedo, A New "U": Organizing Victims and Protecting
Immigrant Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 892-98 (2008).
114. Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDoZO L. REV.
2685, 2694 (2008); AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 105, at 1.
115. See AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL AS'N, supra note 105, at 1.
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In many ways, the legal landscape of labor relations today
bears a great resemblance to the pre-Wagner Act era when capital
held a comfortable bargaining advantage over workers. The
"ossification" of the NLRA-i.e., the law's inability to adapt to
developments in shifting workplace dynamics-has resulted in a
legal framework that is incapable of protecting a workforce that
could not have been envisioned in the early twentieth century.116
Today's workforce is interracial, mixed-gender, and white-collar;
this is in stark contrast to the white, male, blue-collar worker of
the 1930s and 1940s.117 And because unions have historically had
greater success organizing workers with similar interests and
backgrounds, 118 the new and highly stratified workforce presents
problems that necessitate a dramatic overhaul of U.S. labor law
and jurisprudence.
A. Inadequate Remedies for Unfair Labor Practices Thwart
Labor Rights Protections for Low-Wage Workers
Due to the inadequacies of current labor laws, low-wage
workers in the United States are particularly susceptible to
unlawful discrimination and retaliation for asserting rights to
collectively bargain with employers. 119  Currently, the NLRA
requires unions to provide evidence that a majority of workers
support unionization before recognition, and the employer then
has the power to insist on a secret ballot election.120 The Wagner
Act did not expressly require the secret ballot election; 12' however,
Taft-Hartley modified the law such that where a union presents
an employer with a showing of majority support, the employer can
116. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002); see also Sachs, supra note 114, at 2687 (noting that
the rise in employment statutes like the Fair Labor Standards Act are due, at least
in part, to the NLRA's inability to adequately protect a worker's legal rights).
117. See Befort, supra note 13, at 364-66.
118. Id.
119. Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting Undocumented Workers
in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473, 492-96
(2005).
120. Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304 (1974); Specter & Nguyen,
supra note 6, at 316 (stating that the Board must direct an election by secret ballot
and certify its results if an employer declines to recognize majority support for
unionization).
121. Under the Wagner Act, when a "question" of representation exists, the
Board "may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method
to ascertain such representatives." National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372
§ 9(c), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006)); see Specter &
Nguyen, supra note 6, at 315-16.
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petition for an "election by secret ballot" and require the union to
undergo an election campaign. 122  It is during an election
campaign that workers are most likely to face discrimination and
retaliation for union support. 123
Workers who are particularly dependent on their employers
for their livelihood are easy targets for employers who wish to
resist unionism. 124 Over the last century, the at-will employment
system has indoctrinated workers with the belief that they, as
subjects of the employer, must abide by the ideologies of capital,
lest they lose their sources of income.125 As some scholars point
out, "the micromanaging, condescension, arbitrary decisions, and
pervasive control of the employer wield great power upon the self-
perception of the worker."' 26  In effect, employers who express
disdain toward unions take away employees' sense of autonomy;
the workers are robbed of the opportunity to freely choose whether
or not to unionize.127
Low-wage earners in this situation are under-protected by
domestic labor laws and are highly likely to acquiesce to an
employer's direct or indirect demands for allegiance. The usual
justification for NLRA remedial mechanisms is that Congress did
not design the Act to be punitive, although the Board's remedial
authority under the Act is quite broad. 28 Since the standard
remedies for discriminatory discharges are reinstatement and
back pay129-subject to the employee's duty to mitigate by seeking
work elsewhere-monetary damages are usually slight.130
122. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1).
123. Joel Dillard & Jennifer Dillard, Fetishizing the Electoral Process: The
National Labor Relations Board's Problematic Embrace of Electoral Formalism, 6
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 819, 848 (2008) (noting that during organizing, "the
employer's total control of the workplace is a felt experience.").
124. Id.
125. Id. at 858. The authors state:
In modern society, employers are among the most powerful of the
institutions responsible for creating and perpetuating social ideology ....
The ideology of the employer interpellates the employees' identity, saying
that workers should not collaborate to take more control of directing their
work because they are just workers-it's not their job; it's none of their
business.
Id.
126. Id. at 859.
127. Dillard and Dillard raise an interesting point: "If true freedom of contract is
an objective of [the NLRA], and true freedom of contract is only possible within
collective representation, then protection of rights not to bargain makes little
sense." Id. at 860.
128. Dolin, supra note 13, at 427; see also 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2006) (outlining the
Board's power to prevent unfair labor practices).
129. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10-13 (1940) (ruling that the
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The Board has sometimes utilized its broad remedial powers
to grant "extraordinary" remedies,13 1 such as public reading of
notices132 and granting the union access to employer property for
organizing.133 Clearly, however, these "extraordinary" remedies
are not likely to be of any consolation to an employee who has been
subjected to intimidation, harassment, threats, or discharge. As
previously discussed, a worker's job provides more than a source of
monetary gain, and when a worker faces discharge for exercising a
fundamental workplace right, the worker loses much more than
his or her daily wages. A sense of identity, community, and
citizenship are all tied to the workplace.
Because job security for workers implicates much more than
industrial peace, 134 the standard remedies of reinstatement and
back pay fail to accomplish even their remedial objectives. First,
remedial mechanisms are procedurally too slow. Filing a
discrimination charge with the Board is time consuming-often
taking years to come to resolution-and many workers cannot
afford to miss work during Board investigations. 3 5 But perhaps
the widely held concern that remedies for unfair labor practices
are substantively insufficient is more important for this
analysis.' 36
Back pay awards are lessened by the worker's duty to
mitigate damages by seeking gainful employment elsewhere. 137
For low-wage and unskilled workers, mitigation is often difficult,
and for many undocumented immigrant workers, mitigation can
be impossible. 138 Therefore, actual damages awarded are typically
insufficient to provide incentives for workers to report
discrimination. Furthermore, sophisticated employers facing costs
associated with unionization realize that meager remedial
remedial objectives of the NLRA limit damages to those which is needed to make
employees whole).
130. Specter & Nguyen, supra note 6, at 325.
131. Dolin, supra note 13, at 427.
132. Teamsters Local 115 v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
133. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 616, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
134. Ellen Dannin invokes Senator Wagner to reinforce the notion that "tranquil
labor relations were not the sole consideration [of the NLRA]: 'It all depends on the
basis of tranquility. The slave system of the old South was as tranquil as a
summer's day, but that is no reason for perpetuating in modern industry any of the
aspects of a master-servant relationship."' Dannin, supra note 73, at 245-46.
135. See Specter & Nguyen, supra note 6, at 318.
136. Id.
137. See Befort, supra note 13, at 373.
138. Matthew S. Panach, Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right... To Receive




damages under the NLRA often make labor violations
economically efficient. 139 During the last few decades, after all,
the economy has continued to grow while workers' wages have
remained relatively fixed. 140 Anti-union consulting firms have
become a multi-million dollar industry since the 1990s,141 and
"two-thirds of employers faced with organizing campaigns hired
such consultants" to coach them on both legal and illegal means of
influencing workers' attitudes toward unionization. 142
The alternative remedy of reinstatement is unlikely to appeal
to workers who may be subject to similar harassment once back on
the job. In fact, "a significant percentage of employees entitled to
reinstatement under the NLRA decline to accept it."143 Moreover,
for employers seeking to chill union support, a reinstated employee
in the workplace serves as a reminder to other employees that
filing unfair labor practice charges will not further the goals of
attaining higher wages and benefits. After an arduous and
uncertain process, the employee, under the best of circumstances,
is right back where he or she started, and usually without a
union. 144
Clearly, the NLRA's toothless remedial provisions are
insufficient. The Supreme Court's ruling in Republic Steel Corp. v.
NLRB145 established that the NLRA's remedies are limited to back
pay and reinstatement because "[the Act] does not carry a penal
program describing the unfair labor practices to be crimes.' 46
Republic Steel effectively made enforcing labor rights impossible,
and under this regime, the "battle" cannot be "carried on in a fair
and equal way."'1 47 Indeed, the human right to organize and
139. Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will
Employees, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 449, 490-91 (1985) ("If compensatory damages
in a wrongful discharge case are relatively small, an employer has little to lose by
committing a wrongful discharge.").
140. Summers, supra note 97, at 793 ("Collective bargaining is necessary if
workers, particularly low-wage workers, are to share in the country's general
prosperity.").
141. AM. ANTHROPOLOGICALASS'N, supra note 105, at 1.
142. Id.
143. Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge,
1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 29 (1988).
144. A worker who goes through the process of reporting an unfair labor practice
only to be reinstated may never be made "whole." Besides the denial of protection
of workplace rights, a worker will also be subjected to a potential loss of
professional reputation, loss of status, and humiliation. See Mallor, supra note 139,
at 490-91.
145. 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
146. Id. at 10.
147. Vegelahn v. Gunter, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J.,
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collectively bargain "stems unbroken from the principal of freedom
of association,"'148 and the concept of bargaining refers to the
"relative ability of parties in a conflict situation to achieve their
respective goals." 149  Because workers organize as a means of
securing increases in wages and benefits with their employers-
who view collective bargaining as a detriment to business 15 0-
successful bargaining for employees only becomes possible when
the law adequately deters labor rights violations.
For the modern workforce, especially for low-wage and
immigrant workers, this means that the NLRA cannot live up to
even its economic objectives of promoting organizing and
commercial tranquility, let alone the more fundamental objective
of protecting workers' interests. Ironically, laws such as Title VII,
have succeeded where the NLRA has failed. The next part of this
Article examines the remedial provisions for violations of
workplace rights under Title VII and argues that the NLRA
should incorporate similar statutory measures.
III. The NLRA Should Reflect Remedies for Discrimination
Under Title VII
Congress enacted Title VII with a goal of protecting what are
widely considered human rights: equal treatment regardless of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 151 Towards this end,
courts have interpreted Title VII as "a measure aimed squarely at
deterring employment discrimination," and its remedies reflect
this interest by imposing noneconomic and punitive damages on
employers that intentionally discriminate.152 Title VII is widely
dissenting).
148. Compa, supra note 24, at 20.
149. Dolin, supra note 13, at 340.
150. Cf. Summers, supra note 97, at 793 (noting studies that have shown that
employee participation in workplace decisions actually increases production).
151. Id. Interestingly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled
that "the principle of nondiscrimination against noncitizens in the workplace [has]
risen to the status of jus cogens" based on three principals that arguably apply to
labor rights: 1) nondiscrimination is a norm of international law, 2) states have a
duty to respect human rights that "stem from human dignity," and 3) states have a
duty to guarantee nondiscrimination against any "exclusion, restriction or privilege
that is not objective and reasonable, and which adversely affects human rights."
David Weissbrodt, Remedies for Undocumented Noncitizens in the Workplace:
Using International Law to Narrow the Holding of Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1424, 1435-36 (2008); see also Cummins, supra
note 46, at 40 ("Consequently, U.S. courts have per se jurisdiction in connection
with the doctrine of jus cogens if the conduct violates a norm of universal
concern.").
152. See Michael Weiner, Can the NLRB Deter Unfair Labor Practices?
Reassessing the Punitive-Remedial Distinction in Labor Law Enforcement, 52
20101
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heralded for its success in achieving its deterrence objective, due
in large part to the availability of punitive damages 153-which are
substantial enough to force employers to internalize the harms
workplace discrimination causes.154 U.S. labor law has not yet
figured out how to mimic the internalizing effects of Title VII. One
result is that labor cases have increasingly invoked Title VII in
order to accomplish what the NLRA is seemingly incapable of:
adequately protecting workers from unlawful discrimination. 155
Title VII has succeeded where labor law has failed because of
its ability to evolve with the changing face of the workplace. Prior
to the Civil Rights Act of 1991-which added the punitive damages
provision to Title VII-a plaintiff was only entitled to back pay,
reinstatement, and front pay.156 Initially, the Supreme Court
believed back pay would serve as a sufficient deterrent to unlawful
discrimination.157 Congress eventually realized, however, that
'"Title VII's limited equitable relief had 'not served as an effective
deterrent'. . . and had 'allowed employers who discriminate to
avoid any meaningful liability."'158
Commentators of the NLRA have echoed the critiques that
led Congress to strengthen Title VII's damages provision; however,
labor law has been notoriously resistant to change. 159 In analyzing
UCLA L. REV. 1579, 1622-23 (2005) (suggesting that the Board would be better
able to deter unfair labor practices with similar punitive options to those available
under Title VII).
153. See Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in Employment
Discrimination Cases: A Call For Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735, 740 (2008)
("Punitive damages are ... widely regarded as one of the single greatest motivators
in preventing employers from discriminating against their workers.").
154. Id.
155. Sachs, supra note 114, at 2708-19 (illustrating situations in which unions
and individual employees have enforced traditional labor rights through
employment statutes). "In place of the NLRA's notoriously weak remedial regime,
statutes like the Fair Labor Standards Act and Title VII offer workers robust
damages and immediate injunctive relief if they face adverse action for engaging in
protected activity." Id. at 2690.
156. Craig Robert Senn, Proposing a Uniform Remedial Approach for
Undocumented Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 113, 136 (2008).
157. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) ("It is
the reasonably certain prospect of a back pay award that 'provide(s) the spur or
catalyst which causes the employers and unions to self-examine and self-evaluate
their employment practices .. "' (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479
F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973))).
158. Senn, supra note 156, at 140 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 14, 69,
as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552).
159. See Estlund, supra note 116, at 1530 (suggesting that the process of
"ossification" has limited democratic revision and renewal in contemporary labor
law's statutory language).
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this phenomenon, it is particularly noteworthy that Title VII's
original remedial provisions were modeled after section 10(c) of the
NLRA.160 However, unlike the NLRA, which has always been
interpreted as a remedial statute, Title VII's goal is deterrence. 161
In limiting remedies to back pay and reinstatement, Republic Steel
prevents the NLRA from effectively deterring labor rights abuses
in the workforce. 162 Not surprisingly, the Republic Steel majority
neglected to cite any legislative history for its ban on punitive
damages; in fact, the House and Senate committee reports
expressly emphasized the statute's deterrent goal. 163
The purpose of Title VII's equitable remedies, modeled after
the NLRA, "was-and still is-to 'make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.' 164
But the 1991 amendments to Title VII addressed the realization
that back pay and reinstatement could not actually make an
employee whole without compensation for "humiliation, pain and
suffering."165 No one could doubt that discrimination, whether it
falls under Title VII or the NLRA, causes humiliation, pain, and
suffering. Yet it is unclear why courts have not similarly
interpreted the NLRA's remedial provisions to account for this
very real harm caused by labor rights abuses. Indeed, "because
Congress explicitly modeled Title VII's original remedial provision
on... the NLRA, it makes little sense to interpret the former as a
command to order remedies that deter violations of the law and
the latter as precluding such deterrence without additional
justification." 166
Furthermore, employees can enforce Title VII through
private rights of action, and successful plaintiffs can collect
attorney fees, expert witness fees, and court costs1 67 without being
subjected to the Board's "glacial pace and inadequate enforcement
resources." 168 Thus, remedial provisions under the NLRA should
reflect remedies provided by Title VI. These remedies would
160. See Weiner, supra note 152, at 1622-23.
161. Id. at 1623.
162. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940).
163. Weiner, supra note 152, at 1620.
164. Senn, supra note 156, at 136 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 418-19 (1975)).
165. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 25, as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
552 (1991) ("The limitation ... to equitable remedies often means that victims of
intentional discrimination may not recover for the very real effects of
discrimination.").
166. Weiner, supra note 152, at 1623-24.
167. These remedies are available under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
168. Sachs, supra note 114, at 2690.
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provide adequate incentives for workers to report instances of
retaliation or discrimination for union activity, while
simultaneously providing an economic incentive for capital to
internalize the effects of labor rights violations.
Moreover, parallels exist between employment rights
recognized under Title VII and the collective labor rights originally
recognized under the Wagner Act. For instance, the evolving
demographics of the workplace have created an opportunity for
Title VII and NLRA violations to occur simultaneously. However,
workers cannot always rely on Title VII to provide a remedy for
labor law violations, thus necessitating amendments to the NLRA
itself.
The Supreme Court's decision in Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Org.169 is illustrative. The Court
held that a minority of black workers in a bargaining unit were
required to protest racial discrimination through traditional
NLRA channels of collective bargaining. 170 In essence, the Court's
ruling acknowledged that the workers had been discriminated
against in violation of Title VII, but did not allow Title VII
remedies to be awarded. 171 The lower court in Emporium Capwell
found that the NLRA and Title VII were meant to be interpreted
in reference to each other, such that workers and unions could
seek remedies for discrimination "to the fullest extent possible."1 72
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the substantive rights
created by Title VII could not be enforced through the NLRA,
because it would ultimately undermine the union's united front by
"set[ting] one group against the other.., dividing them along
racial or other lines.' 73
Under both Title VII and NLRA policies, victims of workplace
discrimination should be made whole, whether the discrimination
is based on race, gender, national origin, or union affiliation.
Indeed, a Holmesian perception of labor relations policy would not
distinguish between types of workplace discrimination, since
"[labor] policy is not limited to struggles between persons of the
169. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
170. Id. at 69.
171. Id.
172. Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 485 F.2d 917, 931 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); see also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of
Color at the Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 395, 420-21 (1993) ("[The Board... must also act so that its interpretations
of the NLRA are not inconsistent with the policies underlying other major federal
legislation, specifically Title VII.").
173. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 67.
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same class, competing for the same end."174  Incorporating a
punitive damages provision into the NLRA would ensure that
employers internalize the effects of discrimination based on union
affiliation in the same way Title VII successfully deters
discrimination, and workers are made whole when violations
occur.
Currently proposed legislation, the Employee Free Choice Act
(EFCA),175 endeavors to strengthen the NLRA through enhanced
remedial provisions. While EFCA is a step in the right direction,
its upgraded remedies are not likely to effectively deter labor
rights violations.
IV. Proposed Amendments to the NLRA's Remedial
Structure Will Not Adequately Deter Violations of
Labor Rights
EFCA, originally introduced in Congress in February 2007
and reintroduced in 2009, represents an opportunity for the
legislature to reevaluate the balance of labor's and capitals'
competing interests. Many commentators believe the bill stands a
good chance of becoming law in some form under the Obama
administration. 176 EFCA primarily seeks to streamline union
certification and bargaining processes, while also ramping up
enforcement mechanisms in order to more effectively deter labor
violations.177 Although EFCA's card check certifications procedure
has received the most media attention, this Article focuses
primarily on EFCA's increased remedial provisions.
Section 4 of EFCA, titled "Strengthening Enforcement,"
would enhance the remedial scope of the NLRA in two ways: (1)
employers who discriminate against employees in violation of
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA will be liable for back pay plus double
that amount in liquidated damages, and (2) employers who
willfully or repeatedly commit unfair labor practices will be liable
for up to $20,000 in civil penalties for each violation. 178 The late
174. Vegelahn v. Gunter, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
175. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).
176. See, e.g., Sam Stein & Ryan Grim, How Labor Can Get 60 Votes on EFCA
Without Getting 60 Votes, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 10, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/lO/how-labor-can-get-60-
vote n 173637.html (expressing belief in the Democratic Party's ability to win sixty
votes for cloture on the bill, thereby reducing the number necessary for passage to




Senator Edward Kennedy, one of EFCA's sponsors, stated,
"[w]e... need stronger and stiffer penalties for employers who
refuse to play by the rules. .. . The Employee Free Choice Act
puts real teeth in the law .... Current penalties are so minimal
that employers treat them as a minor cost of doing
business ... "179
EFCA's enhanced remedies, however, will likely not provide
much deterrence. Whatever form the final version of the bill
takes, EFCA will presumably make union organizing more
effective, especially for low-wage workers who are highly
susceptible to coercion during election campaigns. In turn, this
creates an added incentive for employers who oppose unionization
to establish practices that will coerce, threaten, or otherwise chill
union support among workers who are capable of organizing.
For example, employers who favor "merit shop" principles
over unionization may engage in a cost/benefit analysis, weighing
the benefits of maintaining a non-union workplace against the
costs of unfair labor practices.180  If they determine that the
benefits of unlawfully chilling union support outweigh the costs of
a unionized workforce, employers may choose to violate their
workers' rights to organize. 18 1 From a human rights perspective,
labor laws should prevent employers from engaging in this type of
cost/benefit analysis. Strong punitive damages for labor violations
are thus a crucial component to preventing labor rights abuses in
the workplace.
In many circumstances, the proposed EFCA remedies of
treble back pay and civil penalties will not likely meet this
threshold. The major problem with the treble back pay provision
is that victims of discrimination still must mitigate damages by
seeking work elsewhere if they have been discharged. In effect,
unless the law abrogates the employee duty to mitigate damages,
back pay awards to discriminatorily discharged employees are
unlikely to deter unlawful employer conduct.
Indeed, employers are likely aware of the fact that unionized
workers almost always make more than their nonunion
counterparts: between 1973 and 2001, one report found the
difference to be eighteen percent.182 For large employers,
179. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1.
180. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of
Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1282 (1998) (noting the effects of the 'law-as-price"
theory of corporate non-compliance).
181. Id. at 1282 n.57.
182. Ruben J. Garcia, Labor's Fragile Freedom of Association Post-9/11, 8 U. PA.
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unionization could amount to an enormous increase in labor costs.
However, if union support can be chilled through a few acts of
intimidation or the discharge of key union supporters-with the
only real risk a few thousand dollars in back pay awards-profit-
maximizing employers may continue to commit unfair labor
practices. Thus, if EFCA seeks to impose punitive back pay
awards, the duty to mitigate must be eliminated for discriminatory
discharge.
Second, while EFCA's civil penalties provision may deter
some labor rights violations by smaller employers, for large
corporations with huge financial stakes in low labor costs, $20,000
may not be a sufficient deterrent for unfair labor practices. EFCA
should instead contain a Title VII-like sliding scale punitive
damages provision 8 3 to ensure that large employers cannot write
off the costs of labor rights abuses. Title VII provides
compensatory and punitive damages awards that are
proportionate to the size of the business, and employers with more
than 300 employees may be liable for up to $300,000 per
violation. 184
In sum, EFCA is a step in the right direction and will likely
create real organizational opportunities for the fifty-three
percent 8 5 of non-union workers that wish to unionize. However,
EFCA's remedies for discrimination and other unfair labor
practices may not sufficiently protect workers' human rights in the
workplace. Requiring an employee to mitigate damages after an
unlawful discharge devalues and under-protects the employee's
interests in a stable and dignified work life. It is inherently unjust
for a worker whose rights have been intentionally violated to be
forced to make efforts towards reducing the punishment his or her
oppressor faces. Also, a flat rate-and arguably low-punitive
damages provision will not deter abuses in large corporations,
which is perhaps where protections are most needed. Under
EFCA, it is likely that union membership will once again begin to
rise. However, a law is only as strong as its enforcement
mechanisms, and EFCA must provide strong punitive damages in
order to sufficiently protect the workers whose rights it seeks to
promote.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 284, 339 n.270 (2006).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006).
184. Id.
185. FREEMAN, supra note 106, at 2.
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Conclusion
Over time, courts and Congress have stripped the National
Labor Relations Act of its ability to deter workers' rights
violations. As a result, U.S. workers are systematically denied
fundamental human rights. The National Labor Relations Board
has no enforcement power, and employers facing unfair labor
practice allegations can effectively ignore its orders without
penalty.18 6 Under this framework, equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees cannot be realized, and the
goals of the NLRA are frustrated. Both Justice Holmes and
Senator Wagner believed labor rights should be protected by
statute and that "'true freedom of contract' is only possible within
a unionized workplace."'18 7  Ironically, amendments and
interpretations of the Wagner Act over the last half-century have
removed any chance for workers to exercise meaningful freedom of
contract or further their own interests outside the union context.
One way to level the playing field is to return to Justice
Holmes' view of labor unions as the "necessary and desirable
counterpart" to corporate power, where capital and labor have
inherent equal worth. Prior to the turn of the twentieth century,
Justice Holmes laid out a rationale for providing workers with the
power to support their interests as employers became increasingly
wealthy 8 8 Justice Holmes recognized that capital was in a
position to grow exponentially, and that workers without legal
protections would cease to be "persons of the same class.' 8 9
Indeed, labor law today does not recognize workers as
"persons of the same class." Capital subjugates labor, and the
changing face of the modern workforce has posed problems that
U.S. labor law was not designed to handle. Most fundamentally,
the law must encourage unionization and collective action of
workers. For this to happen, labor law must protect labor rights in
the same way that it protects other human rights. Supreme Court
decisions illustrate the fact that labor rights are not valued in a
186. The Board can seek enforcement through the federal appeals courts, but
this process can add years to the enforcement of rulings against employers.
Compa, supra note 24, at 88.
187. Dillard & Dillard, supra note 123, at 860; see also Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 571 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of
minimum wage laws based in part on the belief "that 'freedom of contract is a
misnomer as applied to a contract between an employer and an ordinary individual
employee" (quoting Henry Bournes Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order, 29
HARV. L. REV. 13, 25 (1915))).
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way that protects the dignity and autonomy of the worker outside
of an economic system.1 90 Holmes stated:
[I]t is not necessary to cite cases. It is plain from the slightest
consideration of practical affairs, or the most superficial
reading of industrial history, that free competition means
combination, and that the organization of the world, now going
on so fast, means an ever-increasing might and scope of
combination. 191
To bring balance to this system, labor law must provide
strong economic penalties for employers who violate workplace
rights. Fortunately, legislators already have an effective model in
Title VII. Adopting Title VIi-like penalty provisions would be an
effective way to protect workers' rights to organize while
eliminating discriminatory retaliation. These provisions would be
effective because damages would create an adequate incentive for
workers to bring suits against unlawful practices, and employers
would internalize the injuries that workers sustain. The United
States' adherence to increased labor standards would enhance the
validity of labor rights documents and conventions abroad, and
inroads toward undoing the global "race to the bottom" could lead
to higher international standards. Indeed, "to the extent that
improved labor standards go hand in hand with higher quality,
greater agility, and ultimately productivity, the same competitive
imperatives [as higher costs] can help generate a race to the
top."1 9 2
190. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB 311 U.S. 7, 10-13 (1940) (limiting
remedies to back pay and reinstatement); Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc., v.
NLRB 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (eliminating back pay and reinstatement remedies for
illegal immigrants).
191. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
192. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 368 (2002).
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